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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEC				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA		X		
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA		X		
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/ACIS	X			
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:
(FYI: CIA input provided on time. Studies now being redrafted by IG to accommodate other dept./agency concerns.)

Executive Secretary
17 Mar 82
Date

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NSC review
completed.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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March 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Arms Control
and Public Affairs Policy

In NSDD 18 on U.S. Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control Policy, the President, on January 4, 1982, established U.S. policy and directed a number of specific interdepartmental analyses and recommendations.

With respect to biological weapons, in order to encourage Soviet/proxy compliance with the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the President directed that the U.S. would inter alia, intensify its public information campaign in United Nations and other fora, possibly convene a meeting of States' Parties, and consider taking the issue to the UN Security Council.

As a basis for such actions, the USG was directed to study and submit recommendations with respect to: strengthened verification and compliance measures for the BWC; Alliance consultations; legal issues on formally charging Soviet violations; and relationship of U.S. position on biological weapons to general arms control, East-West, and U.S. strategies. However, the required studies and recommendations have not yet been forwarded.

With respect to chemical weapons, the President established policy and directed USG studies which, inter alia, were to assess and submit recommendations on USG positions with respect to: verification; declarations of stocks and production facilities; entry into force; public posture; relationship to other arms control, East-West and United Nations strategies; and consultation with Allies. These studies and recommendations, due January 30, 1982, have not yet been forwarded.

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Review March 6, 1988

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
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Requirements. It is essential that the Presidentially-mandated studies be completed and recommendations forwarded expeditiously. Accordingly, the CBW Arms Control Interdepartmental Group (IG) is directed to complete the required work by no later than March 23, for National Security Council consideration.

To assure coordination, comprehensiveness, and timeliness of the intensified public information campaign mandated to expose the BW and CW activities of the Soviet Union and its associated states, it is directed that the campaign strategy include proposed White House, departmental, United Nations, congressional, and media roles, as well as a proposed calendar for specific information efforts. This public information campaign plan will require the same degree of interdepartmental planning and coordination (fact sheets, Q's and A's, reports, etc.) developed for the U.S. Binary Production decision. In the absence of such an interdepartmentally-coordinated plan, no individual public affairs actions are authorized.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

CC: Director, ICA

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